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Abstract 
Does international law govern how states and armed groups treat their own forces? 
Do serious violations of the laws of war and human rights law that would otherwise 
constitute war crimes or crimes against humanity fall squarely outside the scope of 
international criminal law when committed against fellow members of the same armed 
forces? Orthodoxy considered that such forces were protected only under relevant 
domestic criminal law and/or human rights law. However, landmark decisions issued 
by the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the Extraordinary Chambers in the 
Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) suggest that crimes committed against members of the 
same armed forces are not automatically excluded from the scope of international 
criminal law. This article argues that, while there are some anomalies and gaps in the 
reasoning of both courts, there is a common overarching approach under which crimes 
by a member of an armed group against a person from the same forces can be 
prosecuted under international law. Starting from an assessment of the specific 
situation of the victim, this article conducts an in-depth analysis of the concepts of ‘hors 
de combat’ and ‘allegiance’ for war crimes and that of the ‘lawful target’ for crimes 
against humanity, providing an interpretative framework for the future prosecution of 
such crimes. 
1. Introduction 
The protection of members of a state or armed group’s own forces under international 
law has traditionally received little scholarly attention.1 Until recently, the common                                                              
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1 A search of the leading textbooks, monographs, and journals on international humanitarian law reveal 
nothing written on this subject prior to 2017, with the exception of Peter Rowe, ‘The Obligation of a 
State under International Law to Protect Members of its Own Armed Forces During Armed Conflict or 
Occupation’ (2006) 9 Yearbook of IHL 3 and Sandesh Sivakumaran, The Law of Non-International 
Armed Conflict (Oxford: OUP, 2012), 246-249, arguing that certain provisions apply to intra-party 
assumption was that intra-armed group crimes were violations only under relevant 
domestic criminal law and/or human rights law, and thus fell outside the scope of 
international criminal law.2 Given that the definition of war crimes under international 
criminal law derives from international humanitarian law – which is understood as 
principally protecting civilians and members of the opposing armed forces who are hors 
de combat, as well as regulating conduct against adversaries on the battlefield – it would 
stand to reason that those actively participating in hostilities on behalf of an armed force 
or group will not be victims of war crimes where abuses have been committed against 
them by members of the same force or group. Similarly, given that crimes against 
humanity are committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian 
population, combatants or fighters would traditionally have been considered to fall 
outside of the scope of such crimes.3 While human rights obligations continue to apply 
to states and armed groups in times of armed conflict,4 violations of human rights law 
do not fall within the ambit of international criminal law, unless the jurisdictional 
requirements of genocide, crimes against humanity, or war crimes are also met.  
However, developments in the jurisprudence of the International Criminal Court (ICC) 
and the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) suggest that crimes 
directed against members of the same armed forces can be considered violations of 
international criminal law. This article examines the ICC’s conclusion that members of 
the same armed forces as the perpetrator can be victims of war crimes and the ECCC’s 
decision that such persons can be the object of an attack against a civilian population                                                              
relationships. The topic still remains under-examined; for example, it is discussed briefly in only one 
contribution (Patricia Sellers and Indira Rosenthal, ‘Rape and Other Sexual Violence’, 343-368, at 356) 
to the landmark 1754-page The 1949 Geneva Conventions: A Commentary (Andrew Clapham, Paola 
Gaeta, and Marco Sassoli (eds), Oxford: OUP, 2015).  
2 Antonio Cassese, International Criminal Law (2nd edn, Oxford: OUP, 2008), 82, arguing that ‘crimes 
committed by servicemen against their own military (whatever their nationality) do not constitute war 
crimes. Such offences may nonetheless fall within the ambit of the military law of the relevant 
belligerent.’ Cf. Sivakumaran, ibid. 
3 The definition of ‘civilian population’ for the purposes of crimes against humanity in international 
criminal law has been informed by Article 50 of Additional Protocol I, which defines a civilian as any 
person not falling within any of the categories of person set out in Articles 4A(1), (2), (3) and (6) of the 
Third Geneva Convention or Article 43 of Additional Protocol I. See for example, Prosecutor v. Blaškić, 
Judgment, Case No. IT-95-14-A, 29 July 2004, paras. 110-116; Prosecutor v. Bemba, Judgment, Case 
No. ICC-01/05-01/08-3343, 21 March 2016, para. 152. 
4 It is well-established that states’ human rights obligations continue to apply in armed conflict: see, for 
example, the International Court of Justice’s Advisory Opinion on Legal Consequences of the 
Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 9 July 2004, ICJ Reports 2004; Human 
Rights Committee, General Comment 29, States of Emergency (Article 4), UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 (2001) para. 3; Daragh Murray et al., Practitioners’ Guide to Human Rights 
Law in Armed Conflict (Oxford: OUP, 2016). On armed groups’ human rights obligations, see Daragh 
Murray, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Armed Groups (Oxford: Hart, 2016).  
for the purposes of crimes against humanity. Having critiqued why we consider the 
approach of the ICC and ECCC in their respective decisions to have come to the correct 
conclusion but by the wrong means, we examine the contexts in which members of the 
same armed forces could be considered victims of international crimes falling under the 
jurisdiction of international criminal tribunals. We argue in favour of an approach that 
examines the specific situation of a victim at the relevant time under the rubric of both 
crimes against humanity and war crimes. For war crimes, this examination focuses on 
whether the victim was hors de combat at the time of their victimization, and their 
allegiance to the armed group in question. For crimes against humanity, this involves 
analysing whether the victim was a lawful target at the time of the attack.  
2. Applying International Criminal Law to Attacks against Members of the 
Same Armed Force or Group: The Jurisprudence of the ICC and ECCC 
At approximately the same time, the International Criminal Court and Extraordinary 
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia both addressed the same question: could crimes 
committed by members of military forces against individuals within the same armed 
group fall within their jurisdiction? In the Ntaganda trial, the ICC had to determine 
whether acts of rape and sexual slavery committed during a non-international armed 
conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo by UPC/FPLC soldiers against child 
soldiers recruited to those armed groups constituted war crimes under Article 8 of the 
Rome Statute.5 At the ECCC, investigations in Cases 003, 004, and 004/2 involved the 
Khmer Rouge’s ‘purge’ of its own cadres and soldiers, involving mass extrajudicial 
arrests, detentions and executions. Despite there being no allegations of an attack 
directed solely at members of the armed forces by the Khmer Rouge, the International 
Co-Investigating Judge (ICIJ) requested submissions on whether an attack by a state or 
                                                             
5 The Patriotic Forces for the Liberation of the Congo (FPLC), the military wing of the Union of 
Congolese Patriots (UPC), the were engaged in an armed conflict in Ituri, a region in north-eastern 
Democratic Republic of the Congo from 2002-2003. Bosco Ntaganda is the former Deputy Chief of Staff 
of the FPLC. There are three separate decisions on this issue, from different stages of the proceedings: 
Prosecutor v. Ntaganda, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the 
Charges of the Prosecutor Against Bosco Ntaganda, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/06-309, 9 June 2014, para. 
77 (‘Ntaganda Pre-Trial Chamber decision’); Prosecutor v. Ntaganda, Second decision on the Defence’s 
challenge to the jurisdiction of the Court in respect of Counts 6 and 9, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/06-1707, 
4 January 2017 (‘Ntaganda Trial Chamber decision’); Prosecutor v. Ntaganda, Judgment on the appeal 
of Mr Ntaganda against the “Second decision on the Defence’s challenge to the jurisdiction of the Court 
in respect of Counts 6 and 9”, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/06-1962, 15 June 2017 (‘Ntaganda Appeals 
Chamber decision’).  
organisation against its own forces could fulfil the chapeau requirement for crimes 
against humanity of an attack against ‘any civilian population’.6 
Three separate chambers of the ICC (a Pre-Trial Chamber, Trial Chamber, and the 
Appeals Chamber) all reached the conclusion that the sexual crimes at issue did 
constitute war crimes, albeit on somewhat different grounds. The Pre-Trial Chamber 
founded its conclusion on an analysis of whether the victims were directly participating 
in hostilities, while the Trial Chamber focused instead on a literal reading of the Rome 
Statute and the jus cogens nature of the violations in question, an approach broadly 
followed by the Appeals Chamber. At the ECCC, the ICIJ found that between 1975 and 
1979 (the period relevant to the temporal jurisdiction of the ECCC), an attack by a state 
or organised group against its own forces satisfied the chapeau requirement of an attack 
against a ‘civilian population’ under customary international law.7 Given the stage of 
proceedings in the cases at which it was raised propio motu by the ICIJ, the Pre-Trial 
Chamber denied any appeal against the decision because of the declaratory nature of 
the relief requested.8 Therefore, unlike the ICC’s decisions in Ntaganda, the ECCC’s 
decision was not subject to any further litigation and the likelihood of it surviving an 
appellate challenge is consequently unclear.  
This section analyses the decisions of each of the chambers of the ICC and the ICIJ in 
turn. It argues that, of the differing approaches taken by the ICC, that of the Pre-Trial 
Chamber is most convincing, although not without its weaknesses. We further posit 
that, while its conclusion is defensible, the ECCC ICIJ’s decision fails to properly 
articulate the customary international law basis upon which it was founded and 
contradicts earlier ECCC jurisprudence without expressly acknowledging any such 
departure.  
A. Victims as not being Direct Participants in Hostilities: The ICC Pre-Trial 
Chamber’s Confirmation Decision 
                                                             
6 Cases 003 and 004, Call for Submissions by the Parties in Cases 003 and 004 and Call for Amicus 
Curiae Briefs, Case File No. 003/07-09-2009-ECCC-OCIJ, 19 April 2016. 
7  Cases 003 and 004, D191/18: Notification on the Interpretation of ‘Attack Against the Civilian 
Population’ in the Context of Crimes Against Humanity with regard to a State’s or Regime’s Own Armed 
Forces, Case File No. 003/07-09-2009-ECCC-OCIJ, 7 February 2017, para. 69 (“ICIJ Crimes Against 
Humanity Decision”). 
8 Cases 003 and 004, D347.1/1/7: Decision On Appeal Against The Notification On The Interpretation 
Of 'Attack Against The Civilian Population' In The Context Of Crimes Against Humanity With Regard 
To A State's Regime Own Armed Forces, Case File No. 003/07-09-2009-ECCC-OCIJ, 30 June 2017. 
At the outset of the case against Ntaganda, Pre-Trial Chamber II confirmed charges of 
rape and sexual violence committed against child soldiers. The Chamber began by 
invoking the prohibition on the recruitment or use of child soldiers under the age of 15, 
which is a war crime under Article 8 of the Statute.9 It noted that if the Court were to 
exclude child soldiers as victims of sexual violence under Article 8, merely by virtue 
of their membership of an armed group, it would be contrary to the rationale 
underpinning the prohibition on their recruitment.10 
Nevertheless, the Chamber recalled that combatants (including child soldiers) in non-
international armed conflicts lose their protection under international humanitarian law 
when they directly participate in hostilities. 11  Reconciling these two seemingly 
opposing conclusions, the Chamber considered that those members of armed forces 
subjected to rape or sexual violence could not be actively participating in hostilities 
‘during the specific time when they were subject to acts of [a] sexual nature, including 
rape’.12 To justify this, the Chamber paid particular attention to the fact that acts of 
sexual violence ‘involve elements of force/coercion or the exercise of rights of 
ownership [which] logically preclude active participation in hostilities at the same 
time’.13 On that basis, it concluded that the Court was not barred from exercising 
jurisdiction over the war crimes of rape and sexual slavery committed against 
UPC/FPLC child soldiers.14  
i. The continuous combat function 
The Pre-Trial Chamber’s findings rightly recognised that Common Article 3 only 
protects those persons not directly participating in hostilities,15 and used that fact to 
note that the alleged victims of sexual violence in the Ntaganda case could not have 
been actively participating in hostilities at the time that they were subjected to sexual 
violence. This position is intuitively attractive, but overlooks an important point. The 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)’s authoritative guidance on the                                                              
9 Ntaganda Pre-Trial Chamber decision (n 5), para. 78.  
10 Id.  
11 Ibid., para. 79.  
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
14 Ibid., para. 80. 
15 Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions refers to ‘persons taking no active part in the hostilities’ 
in setting out minimum standards (Article 3(1)), and further notes, in Article 3(2), that ‘the wounded and 
sick shall be cared for. 
notion of direct participation in hostilities recognises the so-called ‘revolving door’ 
situation, where an individual loses their protection under international humanitarian 
law for such time as they are participating in hostilities, and gains it again when they 
cease directly participating in hostilities. 16  There is an exception, however; the 
interpretive guidance clarifies that the revolving door scenario only applies to those 
persons who are not ‘members’ of an armed group.17 Such membership, in turn, is 
dependent on whether a person ‘assumes a continuous combat function for the group 
involving his or her direct participation in hostilities’. 18  The continuous combat 
function overcomes the ‘revolving door’ phenomenon by examining certain 
participants’ overall participation in hostilities, rather than being based solely on an 
examination of individual acts. The recognition that those fighters and members of an 
armed wing of an armed group who carry out a continuous combat function lose their 
protection as civilians, even in those moments when they are not expressly carrying out 
military functions, bears particular significance for the practical application of 
international humanitarian law. The Pre-Trial Chamber neglected to discuss the 
possible applicability – or otherwise – of the continuous combat function concept to the 
particular victims in the Ntaganda case. 
ii. The scope of the Pre-Trial Chamber’s decision 
The Pre-Trial Chamber’s conclusion raised two interesting issues on the potential scope 
and reach of its conclusions that were not addressed in the decision. The first was 
whether its findings on direct participation in hostilities (or the lack thereof, in times of 
victimisation) could lead to a consequential greater protection for fighters in non-
international armed conflicts than for those in international armed conflicts. This is 
because the law relating to international armed conflicts merely distinguishes between 
‘combatants’ and ‘civilians’, while the distinction in non-international armed conflicts 
is founded on the notion of active or direct participation in hostilities.19 By limiting its 
analysis to the notion of direct participation in hostilities, and finding that the alleged 
victims in this case were protected because they could not have been participating in                                                              
16 ICRC, Interpretive guidance on the notion of direct participation in hostilities under international 
humanitarian law (Geneva: ICRC, 2009), 70-71. 
17 Ibid., 71-73. 
18 Ibid., 33.  
19 Article 50(1) of Additional Protocol I defines civilians as persons who do not belong to one of the 
categories of persons referred to in Article 4(A)(1), (2), (3), and (6) of the Third Geneva Convention. 
See also Additional Protocol I, Article 43. 
hostilities at the time of their victimisation, the Pre-Trial Chamber left unanswered the 
question of whether combatants in international armed conflicts were similarly 
protected when not carrying out combat functions.  
The second potential consequence left unexamined by the Chamber was the impact of 
its decision on the scope of the crime of recruiting and using child soldiers. The 
Lubanga Trial Chamber judgment took an expansive interpretation of the notion of 
active participation in hostilities, in order to bring as many victims of forced recruitment 
as possible within the scope of the crime under Articles 8(2)(b)(xxvi) and 8(2)(e)(vii).20 
It noted that, ‘[t]hose who participate actively in hostilities include a wide range of 
individuals, from those on the front line (who participate directly) through to the boys 
or girls who are involved in a myriad of roles that support the combatants.’21 The 
Ntaganda Pre-Trial Chamber’s findings on direct participation in hostilities raised an 
issue of whether children who were primarily recruited to an armed force for the 
purpose of sexual slavery fell outside the scope of the prohibition of conscription of 
child soldiers. This point was again unaddressed by the Pre-Trial Chamber.  
Notwithstanding those unanswered questions, the Pre-Trial Chamber’s decision was 
met with cautious approval from academic commentators.22 In section 4 below, we 
discuss this commentary, and address the previously mentioned issues of the 
continuous combat function and the scope of the Pre-Trial Chamber’s decision. 
B. War Crimes can be Committed against Members of the Same Armed Forces: The 
Trial Chamber’s Decision 
Following the Pre-Trial Chamber’s Confirmation Decision, the Ntaganda Defence 
contested the Court’s jurisdiction over the counts of rape and sexual slavery. 23 In                                                              
20 Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-
2842, 14 March 2012. 
21 Ibid., para. 628. 
22 Tilman Rodenhäuser, ‘Squaring the Circle? Prosecuting Sexual Violence against Child Soldiers by 
their “Own Forces”’ (2016) 14 Journal of International Criminal Justice 171; Rosemary Grey, ‘Sexual 
Violence against Child Soldiers: The Limits and Potential of International Criminal Law’ (2014) 16 
International Feminist Journal of Politics 601; Patricia Viseur Sellers, ‘Ntaganda: Re-Alignment of a 
Paradigm’, Proceedings of the San Remo Round Table on ‘The Additional Protocols 40 Years Later New 
Conflicts New Actors New Perspectives’ (San Remo: IIHL, 2017), available online at http://iihl.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/07/The-Additional-Protocols-40-Years-Later-New-Conflicts-New-Actors-New-
Perspectives_2.pdf, 116.  
23 Prosecutor v. Ntaganda, Application on behalf of Mr Ntaganda challenging the jurisdiction of the 
Court in respect of Counts 6 and 9 of the Document containing the charges, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/06-
804, 1 September 2015. 
response, Trial Chamber VI came to the same conclusion as the Pre-Trial Chamber but 
relied on a completely different basis, looking to the literal wording of the provisions 
of the Rome Statute at issue and the jus cogens nature of the prohibition against rape.  
First, the Chamber noted that whilst Articles 8(2)(a) and (c) referred to specific victim 
status requirements in their chapeau, namely that the person be protected by the 
relevant provisions of the Geneva Conventions under paragraph (a) or be taking no 
active part in hostilities under paragraph (c), no such limitations could be found in sub-
paragraphs (b) and (e),24 the provisions under which Ntaganda had been charged. It 
added that it would run contrary to the internal structure of the war crimes prohibition 
in the ICC Statute to incorporate the status requirements of Articles 8(2)(a) and (c) (for 
grave breaches and violations of Common Article 3) into Articles 8(2)(b) and (e). 25  
Whilst logically appealing, the Chamber’s position is less than convincing, given that 
it had not been suggested that the charges confirmed against Ntaganda must be 
understood as being serious violations of Common Article 3 or grave breaches. Rather, 
the Defence had argued that the provisions of Article 8(2)(e) (and, by implication, 
Article 8(2)(b)) must be interpreted in accordance with their chapeau, which makes 
explicit reference to ‘the established framework of international law’.26 Hence, each 
offence under these provisions must be examined in light of the treaty or customary 
provision from which it is derived in order to determine its scope and the material 
elements of the crime.27  
The crimes set out in Article 8(2)(e) are primarily derived from Additional Protocol II  
(AP II) to the Geneva Conventions.28 Article 4 of AP II, on fundamental guarantees 
(which include the prohibition of rape and all forms of slavery), is limited in its 
application to ‘[a]ll persons who do not take a direct part or who have ceased to take 
part in hostilities’.29 It could be argued that Article 4(3) – which states that children 
                                                             
24 Ntaganda Trial Chamber decision (n 5), para. 40. 
25 Id. 
26 Emphasis added. This reference to the established framework of international law is found in both 
8(2)(b) and (e) of the ICC Statute, and the corresponding provisions of the ICC Elements of Crimes.  
27 Michael Cottier, ‘Article 8’, in Otto Triffterer and Kai Ambos (eds.), Commentary on the Rome Statute 
of the International Criminal Court: Observers' Notes, Article by Article (Oxford: Hart/Beck, 3rd edn., 
2016), 317. 
28 Ibid, 318. 
29  Article 4(1), Additional Protocol II. Article 4(2), outlining the fundamental guarantees, further 
confirms that those acts are prohibited ‘against the persons referred to in paragraph 1’. 
affected by hostilities are entitled to special care and protection30 – ensures that child 
victims are therefore covered by the war crimes provisions derived from Article 4(2), 
regardless of their ongoing participation in hostilities.31 However, Article 4(3)(d) itself 
undermines this argument by clarifying that the special protection afforded to children 
will continue to apply to those (unlawfully recruited) child soldiers who have taken 
direct part in hostilities if they ‘are captured’. The term ‘captured’ here implies the 
taking by force of such children by the adverse party. The relevance of former child 
soldiers’ capture is important, because it emphasizes that their protection derives from 
their status as individuals no longer taking part in hostilities. Thus, Additional Protocol 
II, as the relevant framework of international law, clearly protects only those 
individuals who are not directly participating in hostilities, including those who have 
ceased to do so.  
While it might be suggested that customary international law supports the Trial 
Chamber’s interpretation, no reference was made to state practice or opinio juris to 
support such an argument. Instead, the Chamber noted the widespread prohibition of 
rape under international humanitarian law.32 Whilst acknowledging that most sources 
of that prohibition referred to civilians and those hors de combat, it concluded that they 
nevertheless did not limit the scope of the prohibition.33 The Chamber also referred to 
the Martens Clause – which mandates that those situations not explicitly covered by 
treaty shall be governed by custom, humanity, and the dictates of the public conscience 
– and recalled that the fundamental guarantees are prohibited ‘“at any time and in any 
place whatsoever” and as such apply to, and protect, all persons in the power of a Party 
to the conflict.’34  
This expansive reading of the established framework of international law is 
unpersuasive for two reasons. First, the Martens Clause is a general principle of 
international humanitarian law which guides combatants and protects populations and 
belligerents in the absence of rules expressly prohibiting certain conduct. While the 
                                                             
30 Article 4(3), Additional Protocol II.  
31 Sellers (n 22), 132.  
32 Ntaganda Trial Chamber decision, para. 46. 
33 Ntaganda Trial Chamber decision, paras 46-47.  
34 Id. (referring to Article 75 of Additional Protocol I, noting that it ‘refers to “a Party to the conflict” 
(emphasis added) and therefore does not limit the fundamental guarantees to persons in the power of the 
opposing party.’) 
Trial Chamber’s decision is not the first time that the Clause has been used to enable 
international judges to engage in the progressive development of international 
humanitarian law,35 this has not been without controversy.36  
Second, the Chamber’s reference to the broad wording of the fundamental guarantees 
provisions is premised on Additional Protocol I, which applies to international armed 
conflicts. It therefore overlooks the important fact that the fundamental guarantees 
provision in AP II, which is the more appropriate legal instrument in this case as it 
applies to non-international armed conflicts, does have a limiting clause. As discussed 
above, Article 4 of AP II explicitly only applies to those not directly participating in 
hostilities. 
The Chamber further noted that there could be no military justification for rape and 
sexual slavery.37 This is correct, but it does not follow that any conduct not mandated 
by military justification in an armed conflict can automatically be classified as a war 
crime. Additionally, the Chamber relied on the ICRC’s recently updated commentary 
to the first Geneva Convention, in particular its commentary to Common Article 3.38 
In this study, the ICRC argued that ‘armed forces of a Party to the conflict benefit from 
the application of Common Article 3 by their own Party’39 and that ‘[t]he fact that the 
… abuse [is] committed by their own Party should not be a ground to deny such persons 
the protection of Common Article 3.’40 The ICRC cited the well-known phrase from 
the International Court of Justice’s Nicaragua decision that Common Article 3 reflects 
a ‘minimum yardstick’ of treatment in support of this interpretation.41 Interestingly, the 
ICRC also cited the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber’s decision in Ntaganda in support of this,42 
while the Prosecutor, in turn, then relied on the new ICRC commentary to buttress its 
                                                             
35 Jared Wessel, ‘Judicial Policy-Making at the International Criminal Court: An Institutional Guide to 
Analyzing International Adjudication’ (2006) 44 Columbian Journal of Transnational L. 377, 390. 
36 Beth van Schaak, ‘Crimen Sine Lege: Judicial Lawmaking at the Intersection of Law and Morals’, 
(2007) Santa Clara University School of Law Legal Studies Research Papers Series, Working Paper No. 
07-47, 26-27.  
37 Ntaganda Trial Chamber decision (n 5), paras 48-49.  
38  ICRC, Commentary on the First Geneva Convention: Convention I for the Amelioration of the 
Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (2nd edition, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2016).  
39 Ibid., para. 547. 
40 Id. 
41  Id. (citing Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua 
(Nicaragua v. United States of America) (1986) ICJ 14, 27 June 1986, paras. 218-219).  
42 ICRC (n 38), para. 547.  
own arguments before the Appeals Chamber. 43  This symbiotic and mutually 
reinforcing relationship between the ICRC and the ICC in expanding the scope of 
longstanding interpretations of international humanitarian law has not been lost on 
commentators.44 
The Chamber’s conclusion on the jus cogens status of the prohibition of both slavery 
(encompassing sexual slavery) and rape under international law is of further note.45 The 
Chamber’s finding that slavery is a jus cogens norm is supported by citing the 
Barcelona Traction case from 1970.46 This is remarkable, as the International Court of 
Justice’s first reference to the concept of jus cogens norms was not until 16 years later, 
in its Nicaragua judgment.47 Paragraphs 33 and 34 of Barcelona Traction, as cited by 
the Trial Chamber, make no mention of jus cogens and instead discuss the concept of 
erga omnes.48 On the specific prohibition of sexual slavery as a jus cogens norm, the 
Chamber cited a 1998 report of the Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of 
Slavery 49  and the Special Court for Sierra Leone’s Brima judgment. 50  The Brima 
judgment cited a 2000 report of the Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of 
Slavery, which in turn cited its own 1998 report as authority for the jus cogens 
conclusion. In other words, the Chamber’s conclusions on slavery as a jus cogens norm 
are bolstered by a single reference that does not support this conclusion, and its 
conclusions on sexual slavery as a jus cogens norm derives from a single source which 
provides no authority for this assertion.51 Its findings that the prohibition of rape has                                                              
43 Prosecutor v. Ntaganda, Prosecution’s Response to Ntaganda’s ‘Appeal from the Second Decision on 
the Defence’s Challenge to the Jurisdiction of the Court in respect of Counts 6 and 9’, Case No. ICC-
01/04-02/06-1794, 17 February 2017.  
44 Michael Newton, ‘Contorting Common Article 3: Reflections on the Revised ICRC Commentary’ 
(2017) 45 Ga. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 513, 517-522.  
45 Judge Ozaki ‘reserve[d] her views’ on the question of whether the prohibition of rape was a jus cogens 
norm, finding the statement on this issue to be ‘unnecessary to the reasoning’ and potentially misleading. 
46 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium v. Spain) (1970) ICJ 3, 5 February 
1970. 
47 Nicaragua case (n 41), para. 190. 
48 Barcelona Traction case (n 46), paras 33 and 34. Para. 33 discusses the nature of erga omnes norms, 
while para. 34 discusses the origins of erga omnes from international law, as well as the principles and 
rules on human rights (including slavery and racial discrimination).  
49 Final report submitted by Special Rapporteur Gay J. McDougall, Contemporary Forms of Slavery - 
Systematic rape, sexual slavery and slavery like practices during armed conflict, Commission on Human 
Rights, Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Fiftieth session, 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1998/13, 22 June 1998, para. 30 
50 Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara, and Kanu, Judgment, Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, 20 June 2007, para. 
705, citing Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Slavery, ibid., 6 June 2000, para. 51. 
51 The Special Rapporteur’s 1998 report (n 49) makes reference only to general sources on the prohibition 
of slavery under international law (e.g. ‘M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Crimes: Digest/Index of 
attained jus cogens status under international law appear to be similarly unsupported 
by primary international legal sources. The only authorities for this assertion were two 
pieces of academic scholarship, both of which recognise that the prohibition of rape is 
not yet a jus cogens norm, but argue that it should be,52 or is likely to be recognised as 
such in the future.53 Thus, the Chamber’s conclusion that the established framework of 
international law justified its interpretation appears not to be fully supported by the 
authorities it cited.  
C. Confirming the Trial Chamber’s approach: The Appeals Chamber’s Decision 
In June 2017, the Appeals Chamber issued its judgment on the Defence appeal against 
the Trial Chamber’s findings, upholding the decision. The Appeals Chamber found no 
error in the Trial Chamber’s interpretation that neither the ordinary meaning, the 
context, nor the drafting history of Articles 8(2)(b) and (e) required the victims to be 
‘protected persons in the (limited) sense of the grave breaches or Common Article 3’.54 
The Appeals Chamber, like the Trial Chamber, found no evidence that the drafters 
positively sought to limit the scope of war crimes.55 However, this is a problematic 
interpretation from the point of view of the principle of legality and the limits of judicial 
law-making. It should surely be assumed that the drafters were mindful of the existing 
limited scope of international humanitarian law when enumerating the crimes under 
Articles 8(2)(b) and (e). That they did not expressly refer to those limits is not a 
convincing reason to expand the scope of the law beyond them, particularly given the 
reference to the ‘established framework of international law’ inserted into both 
provisions. Observers present at the drafting of the Statute were of the view that this 
phrase was added precisely ‘to exclude an all too progressive interpretation’ of those 
sub-paragraphs, and to underline that the offences must be interpreted in accordance 
with established international humanitarian law.56 
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Additionally, both the Trial Chamber and Appeals Chamber findings answer the wrong 
question – the issue facing both Chambers was not, as suggested, whether the status 
requirements of grave breaches or Common Article 3 applied to Articles 8(2)(b) and 
(e). Instead, the question was whether Articles 8(2)(b) and (e) themselves limited who 
could be considered a victim of such crimes, read in accordance with the broader 
framework of international humanitarian law. As discussed above, Additional Protocol 
II (from which Article 8(2)(e) derives) limits the scope of the fundamental guarantees 
to those not directly participating in hostilities.57 To acknowledge this fact is not to 
transpose the requirements of Article 8(2)(c) into Article 8(2)(e). It simply recognizes 
that the two sub-paragraphs relate to different classes of war crimes in non-international 
armed conflicts – those that are breaches of Common Article 3 (Article 8(2)(c)) and 
other war crimes in non-international armed conflicts (Article 8(2)(e)). Despite noting 
the fact that victims of the war crimes of rape or sexual slavery are usually civilians or 
persons hors de combat, the Appeals Chamber found ‘no conceivable reason’ to 
conclude that there were any status requirements for victims of such conduct.58  
The Appeals Chamber further clarified that the inclusion of intra-party sexual violence 
as a war crime did not impinge upon domestic criminal law, because the nexus to an 
armed conflict distinguished this conduct as an international crime, as opposed to a 
purely domestic criminal law matter.59 It also acknowledged, however, ‘the seemingly 
unprecedented nature’ of its conclusions and that there were concerns that this could be 
seen as an exercise in judicial activism or expansionism.60 This issue is addressed 
further in section 3 below.  
D. One’s own armed forces or group as a ‘civilian population’: The ECCC 
International Co-Investigating Judge’s Decision on Crimes against Humanity 
There are two possible ways in which the question of whether crimes by individuals in 
an armed force committed against fellow members of the armed group  are punishable 
under the rubric of crimes against humanity arises: where combatants are (i) victims of 
an attack against a civilian population, and (ii) the object of an attack. In respect of the 
former, the ECCC – in line with the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals – have held 
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that combatants can be victims within the context of a broader attack on a population.61 
With regard to the latter, the targeting of soldiers in a specific attack has not been 
considered in terms of its compatibility with the concept of an attack against a civilian 
population by any international tribunal to date.  
In a relatively brief decision, the International Co-Investigating Judge (ICIJ) concluded 
that members of an armed group or state armed forces subjected to an attack by 
members of the same group could satisfy the definition of a ‘civilian population’. The 
interpretive methodology employed to reach this conclusion was, however, 
questionable.62 Having invoked Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, which applies to convention texts, Article 5 of the ECCC Statute dealing with 
crimes against humanity should have been the focus of interpretation. Yet, the ICIJ 
declared that he was ‘interpreting the law of [crimes against humanity] consistently 
with [its] object and purpose’.63 Assessing the state of customary international law is 
not, however a question of interpretation. Rather, it requires an examination of state 
practice and opinio juris in order to determine the customary definition applicable at 
the time.64 Instead of using the customary definition of crimes against humanity as a 
check on the textual interpretation of Article 5, the ICIJ employed the principle of 
legality to check his interpretation of customary international law.65 While this has been 
described as ‘covering the bases’,66 the ICIJ’s approach was confusing. Arguably, this 
method may have been adopted in order to mask the dearth of state practice and opinio 
juris supporting the decision. 
The ICIJ based his decision on a review of (a) the purpose of the law of crimes against 
humanity; (b) the pre-1975 interpretation of crimes against humanity in international 
law; and, (c) the post-1975 interpretation. 
First, the ICIJ characterised the normative development of crimes against humanity – 
referring to the UN War Crimes Commission (UNWCC) and the Nuremberg Charter – 
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as an advancement in the law to address atrocities against civilian populations, 
including a state’s own nationals.67 The ICIJ ruled that before then, the laws of war 
were narrowly formulated such that victims who were nationals of the perpetrating state 
were not protected from acts or omissions that would be war crimes if committed 
against enemy nationals.68  
Given the temporal period of the ECCC, the pre-1975 definition was key to interpreting 
the applicable definition of crimes against humanity. The ICIJ began by considering 
the interpretation of the term ‘civilian population’ in post-World War II. Significantly, 
and despite quoting the work of the UNWCC when defining the purpose of crimes 
against humanity, the ICIJ did not refer to any UNWCC documentation relating to the 
interpretation of the term ‘civilian population’. This is striking, as the ICIJ’s task was 
to define customary international law at the relevant time. Moreover, the relevance of 
such documentation should be considered in light of the Supreme Court Chamber’s 
assessment in the Case 001 Appeal Judgment that, in light of the difficulty in 
prosecuting international crimes, the requirement of opinio juris may be more important 
than state practice. 69  Notably, the UNWCC stated that ‘[t]he words “civilian 
population” [in Article 6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter] appear to indicate that ‘crimes 
against humanity’ are restricted to inhumane acts committed against civilians as 
opposed to members of the armed forces’.70 This was based on a document agreed by 
the UNWCC’s Legal Committee which concluded that:  
“crimes against humanity” of the murder type are offences committed 
against civilian populations. Crimes against members of belligerent forces 
are outside the scope of this type of crime; as regards crimes of the 
persecution type, the Committee assumes that the intention is to exclude 
also this type of crime, though the wording is not quite clear.71  
Two important points flow from this 1946 statement: (i) the extent to which the concept 
of crimes against humanity was intertwined with the existence of an armed conflict, 
and the resulting impact on interpreting the victim/object of an attack against a civilian 
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population; and (ii) the split conception of crimes against humanity into ‘murder type’ 
offences and ‘persecution type’ offences.  
(i) Interpreting the victim/object of an attack against a civilian population given the 
interlinked nature of crimes against humanity and armed conflict  
The UNWCC’s use of the term ‘belligerent forces’ demonstrates how crimes against 
humanity in 1946 were inextricably bound to the existence of an armed conflict. This 
is exemplified by the UNWCC’s declaration that crimes against humanity ‘denotes a 
particular type of war crime’.72  
Indeed, the International Military Tribunal (IMT) judgment demonstrates how the 
notions of crimes against humanity and war crimes were, in practice, dealt with in an 
overlapping manner. To begin with, the Nuremberg indictment had declared that ‘[t]he 
Prosecution will rely upon the facts pleaded under Count Three as also constituting 
Crimes against Humanity.’73 Count Three deals with, inter alia, the ‘murder and ill-
treatment of prisoners of war, and of other members of the armed forces of the countries 
with whom Germany was at war, and of persons on the high seas’.74  
The IMT judgment, under the heading of ‘War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity’, 
held that ‘[p]risoners of war were ill-treated and tortured and murdered, not only in 
defiance of the well-established rules of international law, but in complete disregard of 
the elementary dictates of humanity.’75 The tribunal repeatedly dealt with war crimes 
and crimes against humanity under the same heading when assessing individual 
responsibility, convicting Keitel, 76  Kaltenbrunner, 77  and Speer 78  of crimes against 
humanity as a result of acts against prisoners of wars. These various findings show that 
members of opposition armed forces were considered victims of crimes against 
humanity and thereby part of a ‘civilian population’.    
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Further, the UNWCC’s work shows how the term ‘any civilian population’ was 
considered to refer to a state’s ‘own subjects’,79 categorising crimes against humanity 
as ‘offences committed on the territory of Germany and her Allies against their own 
nationals’,80 and ‘crimes committed against any person without regard to nationality, 
stateless persons included, because of race, nationality, religious or political belief’.81 
Arguably, the marked absence of the term “civilian” when describing those who made 
up a ‘civilian population’ indicates a broader conception than merely non-combatants.    
Jurisprudence echoes this. For example, the Alstotter et al. judgment held that crimes 
against humanity related to ‘crimes committed against German nationals’.82 The ‘notes 
on the case’ contained in the contemporaneous report on Alstotter et al. further indicates 
the broad interpretation of crimes against humanity being drawn on, stating:  
that the possible victims of crimes against humanity form a wider group 
than the possible victims of war crimes. The latter category comprises 
broadly speaking the nationals or armed forces of belligerent countries or 
inhabitants of territories occupied after conquest against whom offences are 
committed by enemy nationals as long as peace has not been declared. 
Crimes against humanity on the other hand may be committed also by 
German nationals against other German nationals or any stateless 
persons.83 
The use of the terms ‘subject’, ‘national’, and ‘person’ in these various texts when 
referring to those who comprised ‘any civilian population’ is significant. These terms 
– which would include members of the armed forces – are particularly important when 
considering  the need to ensure that acts against belligerent forces, legal under 
international humanitarian law, would not be criminalised under crimes against 
humanity – which could have been achieved by simply using the word ‘civilian’. These 
sources, then, strongly suggest that post-World War II legal documents did not intend 
to exclude conduct against one’s own armed forces from the concept of crimes against 
humanity.   
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The ICIJ did not delve in detail into these aspects of interpreting post-World War II 
sources, other than determining that the definition contained in Article 2(c) of Control 
Council Law No. 10 (CCL10) – which did not require a nexus to armed conflict for 
crimes against humanity – was operative, rather than the earlier Article 6(c) of the 
Nuremberg Charter, in which crimes against humanity were first propounded.84  
(ii) Murder and persecution type crimes against humanity 
The ICIJ rejected the relevance of the post-World War II definition of crimes against 
humanity and its two two-fold ‘murder-type’ and ‘persecution-type’ offences, the latter 
of which (due to Article 6 of the Nuremberg Charter and Article 2(1) of CCL10) did 
not need to be directed against a civilian population.85 This was because Article 5 of 
the ECCC Law expressly requires ‘that persecution-type [crimes against humanity] be 
committed in the context of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian 
population’.86 This is a rather hasty dismissal of the issue, however. The ICIJ was 
required to interpret the state of customary international law in relation to crimes 
against humanity as of 1975. 87  Therefore, the question of whether crimes against 
humanity included crimes of persecution committed against soldiers – by dint of the 
absence of a reference to a civilian population in the relevant texts – is very important. 
Significantly, the distinction between ‘murder-type’ and ‘persecution-type’ crimes 
against humanity endured beyond the Charters of the IMT, International Military 
Tribunal for the Far East, and Control Council Law 10, and is also found in the 1950 
Nuremberg Principles, the 1954 Draft Code of Offences Against Peace and Security, 
and the 1968 Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutes of Limitations on 
International Crimes. Moreover, the ECCC’s Supreme Court Chamber acknowledged 
this twin-track definition of crimes against humanity in the Case 001 Appeal Judgment, 
although it did not take a position on its customary law status.88 
Persecution is an umbrella crime, in that it must be committed through other act(s). 
Consequently, if it is accepted that customary international law did not require the crime 
of persecution to be committed against a civilian population, then likewise the 
proposition that murder-type crimes against humanity committed against members of                                                              
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the armed forces were punishable under international criminal law so long as they were 
perpetrated with a discriminatory intent is equally valid. This would bear on the 
question of how customary international law defined a civilian population during the 
relevant period. This argument goes directly to the principle of legality, as if customary 
international law in 1975 permitted the punishment of persecution against one’s own 
armed forces, then the prohibition against committing other crimes against humanity 
that could be characterised as persecutory acts against a party’s own armed forces was 
undoubtedly foreseeable. The ICIJ’s unwillingness to engage this point was, perhaps, a 
missed opportunity to bolster the decision’s reasoning.89  
Instead, the ICIJ relied on the Alstotter and Ohlendorf judgments,90 as well as on P and 
Others, the H Case and the R Case (three Supreme Court of British Occupied Zones in 
Germany cases), to focus on the nature of the attacks rather than the status of the 
victims.91 On the basis of these five cases, the ICIJ concluded that, according to post-
World War II jurisprudence, the elements of crimes against humanity were satisfied 
when individual crimes were connected to a system of large-scale human rights abuses 
not perpetrated during combat operations, without further enquiry into status of the 
persons affected.92  
The ICIJ considered there to be no further ‘official definition’ of crimes against 
humanity subsequent to the post-World War II jurisprudence until the establishment of 
the ad hoc tribunals of the 1990s.93 The ICIJ pointed to the authoritative definition of 
‘civilian’ in the Blaškić Appeal Judgment, which relied on Article 50(1) of Additional 
Protocol I when holding that armed forces, militias, etc. cannot be considered as 
civilians for the purposes of crimes against humanity.94 The ICIJ noted that because 
Article 50(1) relates to the principle of distinction in international humanitarian law, 
and so presupposes the existence of an armed conflict,95 it did not assist determining 
the meaning of the term ‘civilian’ in relation to crimes against humanity not occurring 
in an ongoing armed conflict.96 The ICIJ also reviewed jurisprudence from the ad hoc                                                              
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tribunals that followed an alternative path to that laid down in Blaškić Appeal 
Judgment, and that focused on ‘the specific situation of the victims at the moment the 
crimes were committed, rather than their formal status’.97 
Ultimately, the ICIJ decided that, because this international humanitarian law-
influenced interpretation of ‘civilian’ was only accepted after the time relevant to the 
ECCC’s jurisdiction, it would not violate  the principle of legality if it were not 
followed.98 Nevertheless, the ICIJ analysed the jurisprudence of the  ad hoc tribunals 
at length,99 despite his role being to determine the customary definition of ‘any civilian 
population’ in 1975. Consequently, the ICIJ’s conclusion that ‘the specific situation 
criterion, rather than the IHL criterion […] must be applied’ is striking,100 given that 
both of these criteria for defining ‘civilian population’ come from the ad hoc tribunals’ 
jurisprudence, and not from the relevant state practice or opinio juris prior to 1975.  
As mentioned above, because of the unique context in which this decision arose, it was 
not subject to further litigation on appeal. Notably, the ICIJ decision is at odds with 
ECCC jurisprudence. In Case 002/01, the Trial Chamber found that there was no 
customary definition of ‘civilian’ in 1975, 101  and adopted what it considered the 
ordinary definition of the term – consistent with the Blaškić Appeal Judgment.102 This 
was subsequently affirmed by the Supreme Court Chamber. 103  Thus, the ICIJ’s 
decision effectively seeks to alter the applicable definition of crimes against humanity 
before the Court., without directly engaging with the issue of following existing ECCC 
jurisprudence,  
3. Parallel Development of Protection? Conclusion on the ICC and the ECCC’s 
Approach  
The preceding analysis showed that both the ICC and the ECCC used creative 
interpretation when deciding that crimes committed by a state or armed group against 
members of their own armed forces fell within their respective jurisdictions as war 
crimes or crimes against humanity. Three Chambers of the ICC have come to two                                                              
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different conclusions, but none have tackled the main weaknesses of their position. 
Likewise, the ICIJ at the ECCC arrived at a conclusion regarding the state of customary 
international law in 1975 with very little reference to the building blocks of custom and 
was seemingly guided by events after the relevant time period.  
As such, the precedential value of the ICC and ECCC decisions may be questionable. 
The anomalies and gaps in their reasoning may lead one to conclude that the decisions 
were not fully justified, and that members of armed groups or state armed forces fall 
into a lacuna of international criminal law, where grave crimes committed against them 
by their colleagues or superiors fall outside the jurisdiction of international courts. 
While such acts could still technically be prosecuted under the domestic criminal law 
of the state in which they were committed, this would, of course, depend on whether 
there was the will to do so (likely to be a particular issue in the case of a state targeting 
its own forces) and the capacity of the justice system to deliver accountability. The 
fundamental importance of the question therefore remains. Consequently, the following 
section examines the parameters of the legal regimes of international humanitarian law 
and crimes against humanity to assess whether there are situations where intra-armed 
forces crimes could be prosecuted as either war crimes or crimes against humanity and 
if the conclusions reached at the ICC and ECCC can therefore be supported. 
4. Towards Accountability for Crimes Against Members of Own Armed Forces? 
We suggest that there is an overarching approach which is based on an assessment of 
whether the victim at the operative time was protected under international law. We 
argue, first, that the concepts of hors de combat (for non-international armed conflict) 
and ‘allegiance’ (in international armed conflict) allow for situations in which 
individuals are protected from mistreatment by their own forces in the context of war 
crimes, and second, that the concept of ‘lawful target’ may provide for protection of 
members of armed forces from their own side in the context of crimes against humanity, 
whether in peacetime or wartime.  
 This approach could be perceived as judicial overreach into domestic sovereign 
matters, but this is allayed by at least three considerations. First, international criminal 
law has an inherent gravity threshold before a course of conduct becomes subject to 
potential individual responsibility. Taking the Rome Statute as an example, there is a 
requirement that in order to be a crime against humanity an attack must be ‘widespread 
or systematic’; and that war crimes be committed ‘as part of a plan or policy or a part 
of a large-scale commission of such crimes’.104 In order to be prosecuted as a crime 
against humanity or war crime, the relevant chapeau elements must be satisfied. 
Therefore, an isolated incident by one soldier against a fellow-soldier will not constitute 
a war crime unless a nexus to the armed conflict can be established.105 In the case of 
Ntaganda, the fact that the victims were recruited to UPC/FPLC forces in order to 
increase its military strength in the context of the Ituri conflict, and that the crimes in 
question took place whilst the victims were either in training camps or deployed on 
military operations, was important to the establishment of that nexus.106  
Second, in any domestic judicial proceedings, the underlying act(s) would already be 
legally prohibited conduct, i.e. the rape of one’s own soldier is still rape whether 
characterised as a war crime or not. Third, for almost a century international law has 
been slowly paring back the traditional notion that how a state treats persons within its 
borders is solely a matter for the state in question.107 Notably, the crime of genocide 
protects all national, ethnic, racial and religious groups without any distinction on the 
basis of the individual victim’s status or role. To suggest that members of armed groups 
or forces are automatically excluded from the scope of war crimes or crimes against 
humanity where the perpetrator is their own state or armed group would create an 
artificial bifurcation in the application of international criminal law. Therefore, whilst 
understanding that states will normally oppose interpretations of international law that 
seem to create additional obligations or places individuals from that state at risk of legal 
jeopardy, the following analysis is firmly rooted in existing international regimes of 
accountability governing inter- and intra- state relations.   
A. Prosecuting violations against members of the same armed forces as war crimes 
The Ntaganda case was not the first to examine whether mistreatment of members of 
the same armed forces could constitute war crimes. Both the SCSL and the ICTY have                                                              
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addressed this question, although perhaps somewhat more tangentially than by the ICC 
in Ntaganda. In the RUF case, which dealt with a non-international armed conflict, the 
SCSL’s Trial Chamber held in 2009 that ‘the killing of a member of an armed group 
by another member of the same group does not constitute a war crime’.108 Even where 
the victim was the member of a distinct but allied armed group (as in the RUF case109), 
the SCSL Trial Chamber reiterated that violence against soldiers from non-opposing 
sides of a conflict was solely the purview of domestic criminal law and human rights 
law.110 The SCSL Trial Chamber concluded ‘that the law of armed conflict does not 
protect members of armed groups from acts of violence directed against them by their 
own forces’,111 and that an armed group cannot, for example, hold its own members as 
prisoners of war.112  
Despite the SCSL Trial Chamber’s finding, the Geneva Conventions do not explicitly 
limit protection to enemy forces. A number of provisions speak generally about 
members of ‘a Party to the conflict’, without saying that such members are only 
protected vis-à-vis enemy forces.113 Similarly, Article 10 of Additional Protocol I refers 
to the protection of the ‘wounded, sick, and shipwrecked, to whichever Party they 
belong’.114  
The ICTY Appeals Chamber took a very different approach to that of the SCSL in its 
2005 Kvočka judgment, in which it concluded that detention and mistreatment of an 
armed group’s own members was an example of when the law of armed conflict would 
reasonably be expected to protect those individuals. 115  The Trial Chamber had 
convicted one of the co-accused, Žigić, of, inter alia, a war crime for the murder of 
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Drago Tokmadžić in the Omarska camp. 116  On appeal, Žigić contended that 
Tokmadžić, a half-Serbian, half-Croatian former policeman who had declared loyalty 
to the Serbian authorities and who had transferred detainees to a Serbian camp, thus 
showing his active role on behalf of the Serb armed forces,117 could not be considered 
a prisoner of war.118 The Prosecution argued that, in light of the nexus between the 
armed conflict, the camps, and the mistreatment, Tokmadžić’s murder constituted a war 
crime. 119  The Appeals Chamber concurred, finding that, because Tokmadžić ‘was 
detained in the camp, he belonged to the group of persons protected by the Common 
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.’120 This approach supports the interpretation 
taken by the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber in Ntaganda, which focused on the victims’ lack 
of direct participation in hostilities at the time of their victimisation rather than to which 
side of the conflict they belonged.121 
i. The Range of Protection in Non-International Armed Conflicts 
In non-international armed conflicts, the beneficiaries of Common Article 3 include not 
only those who have never taken part in hostilities, but also those fighters placed hors 
de combat by ‘sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause.’122 Article 4 of AP II, 
like Common Article 3, draws no distinction between those taking no active part in 
hostilities who are civilians and those who are former combatants, nor is there any 
requirement that such persons be in the hands of an enemy party. Similarly, Article 7 
of AP II, which protects the wounded, sick and shipwrecked, applies regardless of 
whether they have taken part in hostilities. Article 7(2) clarifies that no difference in 
treatment should apply for any reason other than medical grounds. Thus, there is no 
explicit limitation in either Common Article 3 or Additional Protocol II that suggests 
their protections extend only to those in the hands of an enemy. Indeed, the recruitment 
and use of child soldiers, which is prohibited in both international and non-international 
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armed conflicts, is by its very nature a violation committed against members of the 
same armed group.123 
The sole restriction on the application of Common Article 3 (and, therefore, , the war 
crimes derived from that provision) is that the beneficiary of its protection must be 
taking no active part in hostilities.124 This is true also for AP II, which, pursuant to 
Article 1(1) ‘develops and supplements’ Common Article 3. AP II limits protection to 
those not taking, or no longer taking active, part in hostilities but does so without 
distinction as to which side of the conflict they originate from.125 As Common Article 
3 binds ‘each Party to the conflict’ to treat those persons taking no active part in 
hostilities humanely, there is no suggestion that the provision protects only those non-
combatants in the hands of an adverse party. It will, of course, usually be the case that 
those seeking to benefit from the protection of Common Article 3 will be those who 
have never taken part in hostilities or who have ceased to to do so and are under the 
control of the State or armed group to which they bear no allegiance. Nevertheless, 
nothing in the wording of the provision limits its protection to only one side. 
Apart from being supported by a literal interpretation, a teleological interpretation also 
suggests a broader understanding according to which Common Article 3 and Additional 
Protocol II apply to members of the same armed forces when no longer participating in 
hostilities.126 Pictet’s original Commentaries to the Geneva Conventions emphasise the 
humanitarian principles underpinning the Conventions throughout. In his commentary 
to the Geneva Convention I, Pictet noted the ‘universally recognised principle’ 
expressed in the Geneva Conventions that ‘any wounded or sick person whatever… is 
entitled to respect and humane treatment’. 127  The Pictet commentary to Geneva 
Convention III noted that the principle of ‘respect for human personality’ is the 
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foundation of the Conventions.128 This principle, in Pictet’s words, is ‘concerned with 
people as human beings, without regard to their uniform, their allegiance, their race or 
their beliefs, without regard even to any obligations which the authority on which they 
depended might have assumed in their name or in their behalf.’129 
Further justification can be found in the non-discrimination clauses of Common Article 
3 and Additional Protocol II.130 These clauses make it clear that the protections apply 
to all persons not directly participating in hostilities ‘without any adverse distinction 
founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar 
criteria.’131 Pictet argued that the drafters’ inclusion of the non-discrimination clause in 
the First Geneva Convention was a recognition of the principle ‘that when faced with 
suffering, no distinction should be drawn between brothers-in-arms, the enemy and 
allies.’132 Of course, the assumption here was that ‘brothers-in-arms’ or ‘allies’ would 
normally be treated more favourably than enemy fighters, but the non-discrimination 
principle applies to all persons hors de combat, regardless of their allegiance.  
ii. The Protection of Those Hors de Combat in Non-International Armed Conflicts  
When determining whether a member of an armed group is in a specific situation 
requiring protection, the question of whether they are hors de combat or no longer 
participating in hostilities is clearly central. The ICRC’s Customary IHL Rule 47 
defines three categories of persons hors de combat: those in the power of an adverse 
party; those who are wounded, shipwrecked, sick or unconscious; and those who have 
clearly expressed an intention to surrender.133 In its commentary, the ICRC notes that 
Article 41(2) of AP I establishes the principle that those in the hands of an adverse party 
are to be considered hors de combat, a principle it finds to be implicit to both Common 
Article 3 and Article 4 of AP II. The basic premise of this principle is that individuals                                                              
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are presumed to benefit from the protection of their own party, but as soon as they fall 
into the hands of a hostile party, they require the protection of the law of armed conflict. 
On this basis, the fighter whose original armed group has turned hostile could be 
considered as in the hands of ‘an adverse party’ and thus hors de combat, and so a 
beneficiary of the protections of the law relating to non-international armed conflicts.134  
In the RUF judgment, the SCSL described the AFRC fighter who had been detained for 
not carrying an RUF travel pass135 and later killed by the RUF as ‘an hors de combat 
member of the AFRC [who were fighting alongside the RUF]’. 136  Despite its 
conclusion that the law of armed conflict did not protect this individual from acts of 
violence committed against him by his own forces,137 this finding explicitly recognised 
that individuals can be considered hors de combat, regardless of which party to the 
conflict has detained them. 138  The SCSL Trial Chamber’s judgment neglected to 
elaborate on why Common Article 3 could not apply where an individual had been 
placed hors de combat by their own side. Instead, it limited its analysis to generalised 
remarks on the intention of states in formulating the law of armed conflict.139 This was 
an unfortunate oversight, given that Common Article 3 explicitly protects those hors 
de combat without exception. It could have been argued that the logic of protecting 
those placed hors de combat derives from the recognition that they no longer pose a 
threat to the opposing armed forces,140 and therefore are protected only from attacks by 
those enemy armed forces. On the other hand, it is equally clear that those placed hors 
de combat by their own armed group equally pose no threat to the group of which they 
are a member, and thus are entitled to the same protection.  
The conclusion that the only bar to the operation of Common Article 3 is whether the 
individual is no longer participating in hostilities most closely mirrors the analysis of 
the Pre-Trial Chamber in Ntaganda. As discussed above, this approach raises questions 
concerning the applicability of the continuous combat function principle, under which                                                              
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the individual whose continuous function it is to take a direct part in hostilities loses 
his or her protection from direct attack for the duration of their membership of the 
armed force.141 However, while those who carry out a continuous combat function may 
indeed be legitimate targets of a direct physical attack by the adversary,142 the idea that 
direct participation in hostilities or the bearing of a continuous combat function places 
combatants completely outside the scope of international humanitarian law’s protection 
is misconceived.143 While participation in hostilities renders the fighter a legitimate 
target of direct attack by the adversary, the definitive issue is whether they are hors de 
combat in the hands of a party, not whether they are a fighter. Moreover, ‘the right of 
the parties to an armed conflict to choose methods or means of warfare is not 
unlimited’. 144  Therefore, it does not follow from the fact that individuals can be 
lawfully targeted that any party to the conflict has carte blanche to mistreat them.145 It 
would seem illogical to suggest that those carrying out a continuous combat function 
may legitimately be subjected to rape or torture. The continuous combat function is a 
principle designed to assist forces in making distinction decisions on who can be killed 
or injured on the battlefield, and restrictions on the means and methods employed still 
apply when conducting such attacks.  
As mentioned in Section 2.A.ii above, the specific context of the Ntaganda Pre-Trial 
Chamber decision, where it was suggested that child soldiers do not lose their protection 
as civilians,146 gives rise to a question concerning the reach of the notion of direct 
participation in hostilities: would a broader reading of the concept would preclude 
victims from also being recognised as victims of the war crime of conscripting and 
enlisting children under the age of 15 to actively participate in hostilities. The Lubanga 
Trial Chamber overcame this obstacle by reading the concept of ‘active participation in 
hostilities’ as being broader than that of ‘direct participation in hostilities’, with the 
former encompassing roles that support the armed group.147 By contrast, the ICRC’s 
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interpretative guidance suggested that ‘direct’ and ‘active’ participation in hostilities 
are interchangeable concepts under international humanitarian law.148 The Lubanga 
Appeals Chamber noted the different purposes of the wording in international 
humanitarian law (when it is used for distinction assessments) vis-à-vis international 
criminal law (where the purpose is criminalising recruitment of child soldiers).149 On 
that basis, it upheld a reading of ‘active participation in hostilities’ that was broader 
than that of ‘direct participation in hostilities’ for the purposes of protecting children 
from recruitment into armed groups. It is likely that future cases before the ICC would 
take a similarly broad view of ‘active participation’ in order to permit a wide range of 
child members of armed groups to be considered victims of the war crime of recruiting 
or using child soldiers.  
Overall, then, it is clear that the most crucial consideration in determining whether a 
member of an armed group can be considered a victim of particular war crimes150 in 
the context of a non-international armed conflict, provided that the mistreatment fulfils 
the elements of the relevant offences, is whether they were directly participating in 
hostilities at the time of their victimisation such that they are characterised as hors de 
combat.151  
iii. Protection Under the Concept of Allegiance in International Armed Conflict 
Turning to war crimes in the context of international armed conflicts, similar arguments 
can be made, based on the specific situation of an individual victim and centring on the 
concepts of allegiance, hors de combat, and what it means to be ‘in the hands of an 
adverse party’ for the purposes of protection under the law of armed conflict. While the 
law in relation to non-international armed conflicts offers protection to all those not 
actively participating in hostilities, the law relating to international armed conflicts 
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distinguishes between ‘combatants’, including those combatants entitled to protection 
as a consequence of being hors de combat, and ‘civilians’.152  
The case law of the ICTY has recognised that members of the same armed forces can 
be considered ‘protected persons’ under the Fourth Geneva Convention in an 
international armed conflict. This Convention focuses on whether civilians are ‘in the 
hands of a Party to the conflict or Occupying Power of which they are not nationals’153 
for the purposes of protection, but it is increasingly recognised that ‘nationality’, in the 
formal sense of citizenship, should not be the sole determinant for protection under the 
Convention.154 In Tadić, the Appeals Chamber noted that the drafting history of the 
Convention revealed a concern with whether the national was able to benefit from the 
diplomatic protection of a state.155 Thus it was important to construe nationality in the 
sense of allegiance to a Party rather than formal bonds.156 This allegiance approach was 
followed by the Delalić et al Appeals Chamber, which found that ‘protected persons’ 
may encompass victims of the same nationality as the perpetrator if the perpetrator acts 
on behalf of a state that does not offer the victim diplomatic protection or to which the 
victim bears no allegiance.157 
Most recently, the question arose in the Prlić case as to whether Muslim members of 
the Croatian Defence Council (HVO) who were later detained by the HVO could be 
considered prisoners of war protected by the Third Geneva Convention.158 On a literal 
reading of the Convention, it would appear that such detainees could not be regarded 
as having ‘fallen into the power of the enemy’,159 since they were members of the 
armed forces which detained them. 160 However, the Trial Chamber found that the 
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Muslim HVO detainees were protected under the Fourth Geneva Convention as 
civilians, on the basis of an allegiance test.161 It considered that from at least 30 June 
1993, the HVO deemed its Muslim members to be loyal to the Army of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.162 As such, the HVO Muslim members detained by the HVO after that 
date had fallen into the hands of the enemy party and were thus protected persons under 
the Fourth Geneva Convention. 163  On appeal, the Defence argued that the Fourth 
Geneva Convention only protects civilians, and detained HVO combatants could not 
be considered civilians for its purposes.164 The defence also argued that how a state 
treats its own armed forces is solely a matter for domestic law.165 As regards the first 
objection, the Appeal Judgment, handed down in 2017, found that Geneva Convention 
IV, whilst primarily concerned with the protection of civilians, protects all persons who 
fall into the hands of an enemy party to the conflict.166 Applying the allegiance criterion 
as developed in the ICTY’s earlier jurisprudence,167 the Chamber concluded that the 
Trial Chamber was correct in determining that the Muslim HVO detainees were 
protected under Geneva Convention IV, ‘because they were in fact in enemy hands, 
and “[e]very person in enemy hands must have some status under international law [...]. 
There is no intermediate status; nobody in enemy hands can be outside the law.”’168 As 
regards the argument that only national law was applicable to such conduct, the Appeals 
Chamber found that the legal authority for this proposition constituted ‘non-Tribunal 
authorities’, whereas the allegiance test constituted the Tribunal’s established 
jurisprudence from which there was no good reason to depart.169 
The Prlić Trial and Appeal judgments, therefore, demonstrated that if an individual, 
forcibly recruited or otherwise, is systematically subjected to criminal conduct by 
fellow members of the same armed forces in an international armed conflict, they 
should be considered to be ‘in the hands of an enemy party’ since they are not 
benefitting from the protection of that party and cannot be said to bear allegiance to the 
group that is mistreating them.  Thus, when an individual is subjected to mistreatment 
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by his or her own armed group, the key question will be whether the pattern of 
mistreatment is such that he or she should be considered outside the scope of allegiance 
to that party. In these circumstances, and provided that the elements of the relevant 
offences are established, such mistreatment could be prosecuted as a war crime.  
B. Prosecuting violations against members of the same armed forces as crimes 
against humanity 
Perhaps surprisingly for something which is required for the attribution of individual 
criminal responsibility, there is a marked lack of clarity concerning who should be 
included under the umbrella terms ‘civilian population’ and ‘civilian’ in the context of 
crimes against humanity. The ICRC Commentary to Additional Protocol I 
acknowledged in 1987 that: ‘[i]n the course of history many definitions of the civilian 
population have been formulated, and everyone has an understanding of the meaning 
of this concept. However, all these definitions are lacking in precision [and] the 
categories of persons they cover has varied.’170 The Tadić trial judgment noted some 
ten years later that ‘determining which individual of the targeted population qualify as 
civilians for purposes of crimes against humanity, is not […] clear’.171 Despite twenty 
years of subsequent practice, the uncertainty persists. 
Applying the ‘specific situation’ approach, we argue that a ‘civilian’ for the purposes 
of crimes against humanity should be interpreted as any individual who cannot lawfully 
be targeted for attack under international humanitarian law. Determining whether a 
person is a ‘civilian’ either in peacetime or during armed conflict – be it international 
or non-international armed conflict – should focus not on formal bonds but on the 
situation of the individual at the time of the commission of the alleged offence and an 
assessment of whether that person requires protection.172 Because they are designed to 
protect against large scale or systematic attacks on the fundamental rights of 
individuals, the status of a person targeted in such an attack does not affect the                                                              
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characterisation of the conduct as a crime against humanity.173 As held in the Kupreskić 
Trial Judgment: ‘[o]ne fails to see why only civilians and not also combatants should 
be protected by these rules (in particular by the rule prohibiting persecution), given that 
these rules may be held to possess a broader humanitarian scope and purpose than those 
prohibiting war crimes.’174 Because everyone other than a member of a hostile armed 
force or group actively involved in fighting is in a specific situation requiring 
protection,175 soldiers targeted by their own fellow forces should also be considered 
‘civilians’ for the purposes of crimes against humanity. Provisions denying such 
individuals protection under international humanitarian law should not be used to deny 
them protection from crimes against humanity.176 
It is a mistake to unquestioningly transpose international humanitarian law definitions 
into the realm of crimes against humanity. In international humanitarian law the 
definitions of ‘civilian’ and ‘civilian population’ are driven by the principle of 
distinction, establishing the parameters for military action by indicating who may be 
lawfully targeted and killed.177 By contrast, crimes against humanity are focused on 
protecting the individual against arbitrary abuse of power, be it state or non-state power 
– military or otherwise. This is signified by the defining feature of crimes against 
humanity being an organized plan or policy to commit the relevant offences,178 which 
serves to exclude isolated or random acts against limited numbers of individuals from 
being so characterised.179 It therefore fits with the purpose of crimes against humanity 
to consider the need of a potential victim for protection when they are defenceless 
against a state or non-state organised force conducting an attack.180 Moreover, the 
concept of an ‘attack’ for the purposes of crimes against humanity is not the same as 
for war crimes, as it need not include the use of military force.181 Consequently, the                                                              
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international humanitarian law definition of ‘civilian’ which encompasses notions such 
as ‘subordination to a Party to the conflict, hors de combat and ‘participation in 
hostilities’ appears totally unsuitable in the absence of conflict. . Since crimes against 
humanity encompass violations of fundamental human rights, the definition of ‘civilian 
population’ should be focused on international human rights law.182  
Because the initial conception of crimes against humanity at Nuremberg and its earliest 
modern affirmation at the ICTY expressly connected crimes against humanity to the 
commission of war crimes, it is hardly surprising that the definition of who is a 
‘civilian’ and what is a ‘civilian population’ came to be viewed as being the same under 
both legal regimes. Perhaps equally predictably, these jurisprudential sources, 
specifically the ICTY, were relied upon by other international criminal tribunals –where 
a significant proportion of cases involved allegations of crimes against humanity 
committed in the context of an armed conflict.183 However, the armed conflict nexus of 
the ICTY Statute and the influence of its appellate jurisprudence on other courts have 
resulted in definitions of ‘civilian’ and ‘civilian population’ being applied in situations 
where there is no connection with war crimes without considering whether they were 
appropriate..184   
Yet, while the ad hoc tribunals based their interpretation of the term ‘civilian’ in 
international humanitarian law, different chambers looked to different areas of IHL 
when defining ‘civilian’. Trial judgments of the ICTY and ICTR, particularly early in 
their years, adopted a conception of civilian based on Common Article 3 of the Geneva 
Conventions,185 covering persons who had taken no part in hostilities, or were no longer 
doing so – including members of the armed forces who have laid down their arms and 
persons hors de combat.186  
This early approach was exemplified in the 2000 Blaškić Trial Judgment, which held 
that ‘the specific situation of the victim at the moment the crimes were committed,                                                              
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rather than his status, must be taken into account in determining his standing as a 
civilian’,187 a position that was subsequently followed by various ICTY and ICTR 
chambers.188 As noted, the Blaškić Appeals Judgment took a different path, holding 
that the definition of ‘civilian’ and ‘civilian population’ in Article 50 of Additional 
Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions represented customary international law – a claim 
shorn of reasoning189 – and was applicable not only in international humanitarian law, 
but also for crimes against humanity.190 The Blaškić Appeals Chamber dismissed the 
Trial Chamber’s consideration of the specific situation of the victim at the time the 
crimes were committed as ‘misleading’,191 because being a member of an armed group, 
irrespective of whether ‘he is not armed or in combat at the time of the commission of 
crimes, does not accord him civilian status’.192 This judgment was relied on extensively 
in later jurisprudence by both the ICTY and other tribunals.193  
But despite this authoritative Appeals Chamber precedent, many ICTY and ICTR Trial 
Chambers continued to employ the Common Article 3 approach.194 This continued 
reliance on a broader interpretation of ‘civilian’ may be attributed to the conceptual 
difficulty inherent in the Blaškić Appeals Chamber’s focus on the formal status of those 
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attacked. This was best demonstrated in the Mrkšić case, where the trial judgment held 
that a victim of a crime against humanity must be a ‘civilian’.195 Consequently, the 
Chamber acquitted the accused of crimes against humanity for the removal and murder 
of 194 men from Vukovar hospital – 181 of whom were members of the Croatian armed 
forces who were hors de combat196 – because of their the status of the victims as 
members of the armed forces.197 The Mrkšić Appeals Judgment subsequently tempered 
the narrowness of the Trial Chamber’s conclusion, holding that nothing in the text of 
Article 5 of the ICTY Statute required that individual victims of crimes against 
humanity be civilians. 198  The Appeals Chamber thereby overturned the Trial 
Chamber’s finding, declaring that the status of victims as civilians is relevant to the 
question of whether the jurisdictional requirement of a civilian population being the 
primary target of an attack is met,199 but that once established, non-civilians could be 
considered victims of crimes against humanity.200  
The implications of the narrow approach adopted in the Blaškić Appeal Judgment has 
caused jurisprudence to evolve from combatants not being considered as victims,201 to 
‘there [being] no legal requirement that a certain proportion of the victims of the 
underlying crime be civilians’, 202 to the broadest extent possible, namely that ‘the 
victims of the underlying crime do not have to be civilians.’ 203  These judgments 
demonstrate the ICTY’s effort to close the possible protection deficit of interpreting 
‘civilian’ in accordance with Article 50(1) of Additional Protocol I – by relying on an 
expansive interpretation of ‘civilian population’ under Article 50(3). 204  While this 
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‘work-around solution’ serves to provide legal protection to all victims, it is clearly a 
way out of an otherwise unsatisfactory situation.205 Moreover, it creates a protection 
lacuna where the underlying attack does not satisfy the chapeau requirement of an 
‘attack against a civilian population’. Take, for example, a peacetime attack by a 
government exclusively aimed at a section of its own armed forces who come from a 
rival or different political, ethnic, or religious group. There, the victims of that attack 
would not have any protection under crimes against humanity, as the chapeau has not 
been met according to the international humanitarian law -based definition of ‘civilian’. 
The greater the numbers and the more specific the manner of the attack against 
members of one’s own armed forces, the less protection crimes against humanity allows 
when interpreted under the current international humanitarian law framed definition. 
As demonstrated by the above discussion, these soldiers could be protected under 
limited circumstances through international humanitarian law either under the concept 
of hors de combat or allegiance. Therefore, there is technically a greater level of 
protection under international humanitarian law than under crimes against humanity in 
certain circumstances, despite crimes against humanity seemingly covering a broader 
range of potential victims than international humanitarian law.206 
On top of this, the ad hoc tribunals, by interpreting the terms ‘civilian’ and ‘civilian 
population’ through the lens of international humanitarian law, have effectively created 
a distinction in the realm of crimes against humanity between ‘civilians’ and ‘victims’ 
– where no such dichotomy is otherwise evident. Arguably, applying the international 
humanitarian law definition of ‘civilian’ (as excluding members of the armed forces) 
makes the concept of crimes against humanity illogical. Under this interpretation, 
civilians must be the primary target of an attack in order to prove the chapeau element, 
but no victims of that attack have to be civilians in order to attribute responsibility.  
Interpreting the requirements of crimes against humanity in light of what the regime 
seeks to protect and focusing on the specific situation of the victim rather than his or 
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her formal status obviates the need for the legal gymnastics required by the ill-suited 
transposition of international humanitarian law definitions, as well as reflecting the 
inclusive origins of the crimes against humanity doctrine in post-World War II texts. 
International humanitarian law still has a place in this suggested interpretative 
framework, namely when assessing whether the individual is a ‘lawful target’, rather 
than whether that person is a victim, ensuring that there is no situation in which a 
legitimate act under international humanitarian law becomes subject to a prosecution 
as a crime against humanity.  
5. Conclusion  
The mistreatment of members of a party to a conflict by their own fellow forces has 
been little analysed in international criminal law cases prior to the emergence of the 
question at the ICC – in relation to international humanitarian law – and the ECCC – 
regarding crimes against humanity. Though not directly addressed in the foundational 
documents and jurisprudence upon which these two legal regimes were constructed, the 
scope of the protection provided for in each sphere is open to an interpretation that 
creates a legal lacuna that would leave such individuals vulnerable to be targeted with 
impunity under international criminal law for those responsible. The question can be 
approached in different ways in both legal spheres, as seen in the varying approaches 
adopted by the Pre-Trial Chamber, Trial Chamber and Appeals Chamber at the ICC, 
and the numerous views espoused by amici curiae prior to the ICIJ’s decision at the 
ECCC, as well as the decision itself.  
We propose an approach common to both regimes that involves a case-by-case 
assessment of whether the specific situation of the individual at the operative time is 
such that it requires legal protection. International law, and particularly human rights 
law, has grown since World War II to inhabit all areas involving the treatment of 
individuals, such that the sovereignty of the domestic realm is no longer inviolable in 
the face of universal concern regarding the treatment of individuals. This necessarily 
includes members of armed forces. This article does not seek to disregard state 
sovereignty. Rather it recognises the practical realities of conflict and violent state 
repression, in which certain conduct remains within domestic legal competence until 
such times as the mistreatment of individuals reaches a certain threshold beyond which 
it becomes a matter of concern to international law. Allowing for the punishment under 
international humanitarian law and crimes against humanity of members of armed 
forces or groups for crimes committed vis-à-vis individuals on their own side is in 
keeping with the nature and purpose of the protection envisaged by international law.  
Proceeding in the manner set out above ensures that members of a party’s own forces 
are not the victims of international crimes with no accountability possible under 
international criminal law. Individuals in an armed group or force are legally vulnerable 
to attack by any hostile opposing force. Such status must not simultaneously deprive 
individuals of protection under international criminal law where the group or armed 
force to which they belong and whom they legitimately expect or practically depend 
upon to ensure their safety are responsible for gross mistreatment and deprivation of 
their individuals rights. The approach outlined demonstrates a legal basis for this which 
is rooted in  seminal international law texts and practice and ensures that international 
criminal law covers those who need protection, irrespective of whether they have 
voluntarily joined or are enlisted or coerced into a fighting force, against the worst 
delicts of our time. 
